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Abstract.This expositoryarticlefocuses onthefundamental differences
betweenfirst-orderlogicand second-orderlogic. It employs second-order propo-
sitionsand second-order reasoning in a naturalway to illustrate the fact that
second-orderlogic is actually a familiarpartof ourtraditionalintuitive logical
frameworkandthatit is notan artificialformalismcreatedby sp ecialists for tech-
nical purposes. To illustratesome of the main relationships between first-order
logic and second-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-
orderlogic,whichis m or erudimentarythanfirst-order and whichis transcended
by first-orderin the same way thatfirst-orderis transcended by second-order.
The heuristiceffectiveness and the historicalimportance of second-order logic
are reviewedin thecontext of thecontemporarydebate over the legitimacyof
second-order logic. Rejectionof second-orderlogic is viewed as involvingradical
repudiationof partof ourscientifictradition. Buteven if genuine logic comes to
be regardedas excludingsecond-orde r reasoning, which is a real possibility, its
effect iveness as a heuristic instrumentwillremain and its importan cefor under-
standingthehistoryof logicand m athematics willnotbe diminished. Second-
orde r logic may some day be gone, but it will never be forgotten. Technical
formalisms have been avoidedentire ly in aneffortto reachan inte rdisciplinary
audience, butevery efforthas been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor.
No matterwhathumanactionyou consider,if everyonedoes it to everyone
doing it tothem, theneveryonehas it done tothem by everyone to whom
theydo it. For example, if everyoneteacheseveryonewho teaches them,
theneveryone istaughtby everyonetheyteach.Likewise, if everyonehelps
everyonewho helpsthem, theneveryoneis helpedby everyonetheyhelp. The
same holds for"encourages", "hinders","supports", "opposes", "ignores" ,
andtherest.
Each oftheabovepropositionsis actuallya tautology, a propositionimplied
by its ownnegation. In fact, each ofthemcan be proved to betrueby logical
reasoningalone; e.g., by deducingthem from theirown negations. Since
every propositionin thesame form as atautologyis againa tautology, a
discourseformallysimilarto thatexpressedaboveobtainsin every universe
of discourse,notjustin theuniverseof humans.
In metalogic,forexample, we often discuss theuniverseof propositionsin
so far as various logicalrelationsareconcerned. By a logical relation I mean
relationssuch asimplication, consequence, contradiction, compatibility, in-
dependence,etc. More specifically, I mean whatare calledbinaryrelations
on theuniverse ofpropositions.If R indicatesuch arelationand ifa andb
are eachindividualpropositions, thenaRb canbe used toexpressthepropo-
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sit ionthatthefirstpropositiona is relatedby R to the secondproposition
b. It is notexcluded,of course,thata andb arethesame proposition.For
example, everypropositionimplies itselfandsome butnoteveryproposition
contradictsitself.
Now logicalrelationsarecertainlynotactions. Saccheri's Postulatecontra-
dicts theParallelPostulatebutthereis no actionthatSaccheri's Postulate
couldperform. Nevertheless, as we havejustseen, relation verbs function
grammaticallyin certaincontextsin a mannersimilarto thefunctionof ac-
tion verbs. The relationverbs significantin theuniverseof humansinclude
the following:outweighs,outlives,succeeds (inseveralsenses), precedes (in
several senses), equals (in many senses), and manyothers. The actionverbs
significant intheuniverse ofhumansinclude the following: calls (inatleast
one sense), serves (inat leastone sense), teaches,commands, obeys, and
many others.
In normalEnglishsome of thelogicalrelationsareexpressedby relation
verbs, as we have seen. For example,implicationis expressedby 'implies'
and contradictionis expressedby 'contradicts'. However, some ofthemare
expressedby relation nouns. For example, consequenceis expressedby the
relationoun 'consequence'.The law oftransitivityof consequenceis that
everyconsequenceof aconsequenceof apropositionis againa consequenceof
thatproposition. Moreover,thereare logicalrelationsexpressedby relation
adjectives. Compatibilityand independenceare expressedby 'compatible'
and 'independent'.Aristotle's fundamentalaw ofcompatibilityof truthis
thatevery twotruepropositionsarecompatiblewith eachother. Using 'inde-
pendent' in themost widelyacceptedsense we can saythateveryproposition
which isindependentof a givenpropositionis neitherimplied by norcontra-
dictedby the givenproposition, and conversely, everypropositionwhich is
neitherimplied by norcontradictedby a givenpropositionis independentof
the givenproposition.
One reasonfor reviewing the various waysthatlogicalrelationsare ex-
pressed inEnglishis topointoutwhatallcreativewritersalreadyknow, viz.
thatknowledge of theconventionalrules of Englishshouldenhancebutnot
inhibitEnglishwriting. For example, my very firstsentenceuses the plu-
ralpronoun'them' as coreferentialwith 'everyone',which issingular. Even
worse, fromthepoint of view ofconventionalrules, is my use ofthefiller
'you consider'.The propositionbeing expressedis not apredictionof what
willhappenif you considersomething.The propositionis notaboutyou per
se atall.The sentenceexpressesa general proposition predicatinga certain
complexpropertyof everyactionon the universe ofhumans. The phrase'no
matterwhathumanactionyou consider'is justa heuristicallyeffective way
ofexpressinga universalquantifier. From a logicalpointof view the following
would dojustas well: 'everyhumanactionis one suchthat', 'everyhuman
actionis one where', 'wit h everyhumanaction', etc. At anyrate,a sentence
thatviolatesthe conventionalrules of Englishapplicableto the expression
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of a givenpropositionis sometimes neverthelessa perfectlyacceptableand
effective way ofexpressingthatveryproposition.
Whethera sentenceis an acceptableand effectiveexpressionof a given
propositionis a matterof howreaderstakeit, andnot amatterofconventions
establishedin thepast. Now wearereadyto presenta discourseobtaining
in theuniverseof propositionsandformallysimilarto theone whichbegan
thisessay.
No matterwhatlogicalrelationyou consider,if every givenproposition
bears it to every proposition bearingit tothegiven proposition,thenev-
ery givenpropositionis borneit by everypropositionthegiven proposition
bearsit to. For example, if everypropositioncontradictseveryproposition
contradictingit, theneverypropositionis contradictedby everyproposition
it contradicts. Likewise, if everypropositionimplies everypropositionim-
plying it,theneverypropositionis implied by everypropositionit implies.
The same holds for "is aconsequenceof', "is compatiblewith", "is logically
equivalento", "is independentof', "is a contradictoryoppositeof', and the
rest.
The propositionsexpressedin theabove paragrapharealltautologiesand
theyare all laws of logic.The propositionsin thefirstparagraphofthisessay
are alltautologiesbutnone ofthem are laws of logicbecausetheyare not
abouta logicalsubject-matter. The proposition"Everypropositionimplies
everypropositionimplyingit" isabouta logicalsubject-matterbutit is not
a law of logicbecauseit is false. For example, "Everypropositionis true"
implies "Everyfalsepropositionis true", butnot conversely.The proposition
"Everypropositioncontradictseverypropositioncontradictingit" is a law
of logic, ofcourse,butit is not a tautologybecauseit is inthesame form
as a propositionconsideredjustabove and found to be false. By a law of
logic Imean a truepropositionabouta logicalsubject-matter, e.g., about
propositions,aboutarguments,aboutargumentations, etc.
The twoproperties,being tautologousandbeing a law of logic, areorthog-
onal in thesensethateach ofthefourcombinationsofthetwo is exemplified.
We have seen abovethatsome butnoteverytautologyis a law of logicand
thatsome butnoteverynon-tautologyis a law of logic.Thereis much con-
fusionconcerningthiselementarypoint. Some butnotall oftheconfusion
is more or lessdeliberatelynurturedin theserviceof variousdogmas which,
happily,are waning inpopularity.
The proposition,"Every propositioncontradictsevery propositioncon-
tradictingit", is thelaw ofsymmetry (or reciprocity)of contradictionand
"Some propositionimplies some propositionnot implying it in return"is
thelaw of non-symmetry(or non-reciprocity)ofimplication. "No contradic-
toryoppositeof a contradictoryoppositeof a propositionis a contradictory
oppositeof thatproposition"is the law ofantitransitivityof contradictory
opposition. A contradictory opposite of apropositionis, of course, apropo-
sitionlogicallyequivalento thenegationof thatproposition.For example,
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"Some truepropositionis nottautologous"and "Not everytrueproposition
is tautologous"are bothcontradictoryoppositesof "Everytrueproposition
is tautologous".In orderto avoid confusion itshouldbe notedthat,although
every twopropositionsthatarecontradictoryoppositesof eachothercontra-
dicteach other,not every twopropositionsthatcontradicteachotherare
contradictoryopposites. To takean extremeexample, "No propositionim-
plies itself'contradicts"Some propositionimplies everyproposition".The
same exampleillustratesanotherpointthatclarifiesthingsand helps to avoid
confusion, viz. thatalthoughno truepropositioncontradictsa truepropo-
sition,some falsepropositionscontradictfalsepropositions. In fact, some
falsepropositionscontradicthemselves. Thus althoughno twocontradict-
ing propositionsarebothtrue, some twocontradictingpropositionsareboth
false. In such cases, i.e., when twocontradictingpropositionsarebothfalse,
theyare notcontradictoryoppositesbecauseevery twocontradictoryoppo-
siteshave differenttruth-values.
A contmdiction (or a self-contradiction)is a propositionthatcontradicts
itself, i.e., thatimplies its ownnegation.Every contradictionis a contra-
dictoryopposite of a tautologyand everytautologyis a contradictoryop-
positeof a contradiction.A propositionis said to becontmdictory (or self-
contradictory)if it is acontradiction.Everytwocontradictorypropositions
contradicteach otherbut no twocontradictorypropositionsare contradic-
toryopposites of eachother. The expression'two contradictoryproposi-
tions'means "twopropositionseach of which iself-contradictory"whereas
'twocontradicting propositions'means "twopropositionscontradictingeach
other"which, in view of thesymmetricalnatureof "contradicts" , amounts
to "twopropositionsone of whichcontradictstheother".
In ordinarytechnicalEnglish,'is contraryto' and 'is a contraryto' are
ambiguous. Sometimes, "contradicts"is meantand sometimes "is a contra-
dictoryopposite of' is meant. Surprisingly,the ambiguitydoes not seem
to betroublesome.However, in former times logicians hadattacheda third
technicalmeaningthatdid lead toconfusion. Two propositionswere said to
be contraries (sc of eachother)if theycontradicteachotherbuttheir nega-
tionsdo notcontradicteachother. For example, "Everynumberis prime"
and "Everynumberis non-prime" arecontraries. It is easy to provethat
every twocontradictingpropositionsthatarenotcontradictoryoppositesare
contraries,andvice versa. In modernlogic,'contrary'is rarelyused inthe
obsoletetechnicalsense.
We have had occasionjustnow tostateseveral laws of logic and to men-
tion(or talkabout)several laws of logic. As indicatedabove, by a law of
logic I mean atruepropositionabouta logicalsubject-matter(propositions,
arguments,argumentations,etc.). The most basic laws of logic arethelaws
of excludedmiddle, non-contradiction, and truthandconsequence: "Every
propositionis eithertrueor false", "Nopropositionis bothtrueand false"
and "Everypropositionimplied by atruepropositionis true".
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The laws of logic, in fact allpropositionsaboutlogicalsubject-matterare
in some sensesecond-level (or meta-level) propositionsin thesensethat hey
are aboutthingsthatarethemselvesaboutthings(usually, of course, non-
logicalthings). Some people, eitherignorantof or inoppositionto logical
traditon, call suchpropositions'second-order' .This is not how 'second-
order'is used in this essayalthoughsome second-levelpropositionsare also
second-order. A propositionis classified asbasic, first-order, second-order,
etc., not on the basis ofwhatit isaboutbutratheron thebasis of its logical
structure. Thevery firstpropositionof this essay issecond-order. Thesecond
propositionis first-order.Everypropositionto the effectthatone named
propositionis in a mentionedlogicalrelationto anothernamed proposition
is basic, e.g., "Saccheri'sPostulatecontradictsthe ParallelPostulate". It
will become obviousthatthetwo properties,being second-level and being
second-order,areorthogonal.
The basic propositions, veryroughlyspeaking, are thosewithoutcommon
nouns. It is perhapseasiest todescribethe basic propositions of arithmetic
(BPA) . Actually,insteadof describingthe BPA outright,it isconveniento
describethebasic sentences of arithmetic (BSA) and thento saythattheba-
sic propositionsofarithmeticarethepropositionsexpressedby the basic sen-
tenceswhenthesentencesare understoodin theirintendedinterpretations.
Now, thesubstantivesof thebasic sentencesof arithmeticare exclusively
numerals (number-names)in thewide sense: 'zero','one', 'two', 't hree',... ,
'zeroplus one', 'zero plustwo', . .. , 'two plus (zero timesone)', . ... Among
thenumeralsI alsointend: 'two-squared','two-cubed', etc. The atomic sen-
tencesof arithmeticinclude, inthefirst place, all so-calledequations: 'one
plus one is two', 'one plus two isne',etc., in otherwords anysentencein the
patternnumeral is numeral. The 'is' here, of course, isntendedto express
numericalidentitywhich is oftenimproperlycalledequality andexpressedby
'equals'. Next we havethesentencesthatnormallyattributea qualityto a
number, e.g., 'one iseven','one is odd', 'two isprime', 'five isperfect';and so
on. Next we have thes ntencesthatnormallyrelateone numbertoanother,
e.g., 'two exceedsthree','threedivides two', etc.These includetheidenti-
ties (orequalities,equations)alreadymentioned. Next we have thes ntences
thatnormallyindicatethat hreenumbersare in aternaryrelation,e.g., 'two
is betweenone andthree', etc.
Thereare alsoquaternaryrelationalsentences,e.g., 'one is tothreeas
threeis tonine'. And so on.Anythingofthissortis countenancedas long as
thereare no common nouns. Evencommon nouns are allowed as long asthey
areunderstoodas nominalizedadjectives(e.g., 'two is aprime' means "two
is prime") or asnominalizedrelatives(e.g., 'two is a divisor of four' means
"two divides four"), etc. Once theatomicbasic sentencesofarithmetichave
been determined,the basicsentencescan be defined as the so-calledtruth-
functionalcombinationsofatomicsentences,theatomicsentencespluswhat
can beobtainedfrom atomic sentencesby negations,conjunctions, disjune-
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tions, conditionals,bi-conditionals, etc. It should be explicitlymentioned
in thisconnectionthatpassives (or converses) ofbinaryrelationverbs are
againbinaryrelationalverbs and thussentencesuch as 'two isdivided by
four', 'two is exceeded by four', etc. are included. Likewise includedare
sentencesinvolving the so-called modifiedr lationverbs : 'properlydivides',
'immediatelyprecedes', 'immediately exceeds', etc.
Basic logic is the logic of basicpropositions. Basic logic isconcernedfun-
damentallywith thequestionof how wedeterminethevalidity orinvalidity
of anargumentwhose premisesandconclusion are exclusively basic propo-
sitions. As you know, anargumentis determinedto be valid by giving a
derivation(or adeduction)of its conclusion from its premises. This means
giving anextendeddiscourse,normallymuch longerthanthepremises-plus-
conclusionwhich showsstep-by-stephow theconclusion can be seen to be
truewere the premises true.The rules for making up thesed rivationsare
obtainedby lookingatwhatpeople dowithbasic propositions when they
are reasoning correctly. Inorderto deduce from any set of basic premises
any basic conclusionthatactuallyfollows, itis sufficient to use rules from a
very small set. These includetheusual rules ofpropositionalogic,therule
of substitutionof identities,therule of conversion (the activeand passive
are interdeducible)and the logical axioms ofidentity("one is one", etc.).
To show thata given basic conclusion does notf llowfrom a given basic
premise-set, it is sufficient toproducea counterargument, i.e., a conclusion
anda premise-settogetherin thesame form and having false conclusionand
truepremises. For example, to showthattheargumenton the left below is
invalid itis sufficient to noticethattheargumenton theright is inthesame
form andhas truepremises and false conclusion.
Two is notthree.
Threeis not two plus two.
? Two is not two plus two.
One is not two.
Two is not one times one.
? One is not one times one.
The argumenton therightis obtainedin threesteps fromtheargument
on theleft.First'one' is substitutedeverywhere for 'two' on theleft. Thenin
the "new" leftargument(in which'two'no longer occurs),'two' issubstituted
everywherefor'three'.Then in the "second new" leftargument,'times' is
substitutedfor'plus'.
Strictlyspeakingan argument (more properly,premise-conclusion argu-
ment) is a twopartsystem composed of a set ofpropositionscalledthe
premise-set and a singlepropositioncalled theconclusion. To represent
or express anargumentwe use anargument-textwhich is a list ofsen-
tences (notpropositions)followed by a single sentence somehowmarkedas
the conclusion-sentence. Some logic books use a line above the conclusion-
sentence,butit is easier and less messy to use aquestion-markas above.
The methodoutlinedabove oftransformingoneargument-textintoanother
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argument-textin such a waythattheargumentrepresentedby thesecondis
in thesame form astheargumentrepresentedby thefirst works only whenthe
argument-textsarewrittenin a so-calledlogically perfect language in which
theoutergrammaticalform ofthesentencesmirrorsexactlytheinnerlogicai
form ofthepropositions. Whenlogical issues areimportant,thelanguagein
questionis regimented (normalized) so thatit becomes logicallyperfect(or
approximatelyso). This is why I write'two plus (zero times one)' insteadof
'twoplus zerotimes one'. Logicianstypicallygo immediatelyto asymbolic
languagecarefullyconstructedto be logicallyperfectbutformany purposes,
especiallythatofexposition,thismethod,thoughvirtuallyessentialfor some
purposes,can becounter-productive.
Basic logiccanbe calledfinite logic becauseevery finite invalidargument
of basic logic isrefutableby a counterargumentwhose propositionshave
reference only to a finiteumberof individuals.By a finiteargumentI mean
an argumenthaving only a finitenumberof premises and by referenceonly
to a finitenumberof individualsI mean not onlythatthepropositionsrefer
only to finitelymanyindividuals(which is obvious)butalsothathefunctions
referredto are all defined on one andthesame finiteuniverseof discourse.
By theway,thisincludestheso-calledzero-premisearguments(arguments
havingthenullpremise-set)which are valid when and only whent econclu-
sion is atautology.Some examplesfollow.
? One is one.
? If one is twothentwo is one.
? If (if one is not twothenone is two)thenone is two.
? If one exceeds twothentwo is exceeded by one.
It follows fromwhatwassaid abovethatevery basicpropositionthatis not
a contradictionis in thesame logical form as atruebasic propositionhaving
referenceonly to a finitenumberof objects. This means thatamong the
basic propositionsthereare noso-calledinfinity propositions. In orderfor a
propositionto be aninfinity proposition it isnecessaryandsufficient hatit be
non-contradictoryandfor everypropositionin thesame formhavingreference
only to a finitenumberof individualsto be false. Inotherwords aninfinity
propositionis a propositionexpressedby a sentencewhich is "satisfiable"
only in infinite universes ofdiscourse.
Basic logic covers most ofthearithmeticreasoningdone by school chil-
dren,all ofthelogic "done" bycomputers(thoughin a sensecomputerscan
simulate finitestretchesofhigherlogics),andmuch ofthelogic onthenormal
aptitudetest.
In a sense,first-order logic (FOL) begins when wegeneralizebasic propo-
sitions. In fact, it is notstretchingthingsto saythatbasic tautologiesare
tautologiesbecause theyare instancesof first-ordertautologies.When you
prove a basictautologyyou feelthatyou have notexhaustedyourreasoning
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in thatdirection. To illustratehisI will give a basictautologyandthengive
four first-ordergeneralizations.
? If threeexceeds twothentwo is exceeded bythree.
? Everynumberexceedingtwo is anumberthattwo isexceededby.
? Everynumberthatthreeexceeds is exceeded bythree.
? Everynumberexceedinga givennumberis a numberthegiven num-
ber is exceeded by.
? Everynumberthata givennumberexceeds is exceeded bythegiven
number.
We areinclinedto thinkthatthebasic tautologyis logicallyderivedfrom
its generalization, e.g., that"if threeexceeds twothentwo isexceededby
three"is truebecause "everynumberexceedingtwo is onethattwo is ex-
ceeded by" istrue... thusemphasizingthefactthat heformeris no peculiar-
ity ofthree.Likewise weareinclined tothinkthat helattergeneralizationis
truebecauseofthetruthof its generalization,viz. "Everynumberexceeding
an arbitrarynumberis one thatthearbitrarynumberis exceededby" ...
thusemphasizingthatno peculiarityof two is involved.
The first order sentences of arithmetic (FOSA) arethesentences obtain-
able fromthebasic sentencesby quantificationand takingtruth-functional
combinations. It is important hat heseoperationsaretakenrecursively, e.g.,
a basic sentencecan be generalizedand thencombined withothergeneral-
izationsby truth-functionalcombinationsandthengeneralizedagainbefore
takingfurthertruth-functionalcombinations. The first-order propositions of
arithmetic (FOPA) arethepropositionsexpressedby thefirst-ordersentences
interpretedin theusual way. Below is anexampleof one ofthesimplestvalid
argumentsin first-orderlogic.
Everynumberis eithereven or odd.
No numberis bothevenandodd.
Everynumberwhich isodd is one whosesquareis odd.
? Everynumberwhosesquareis even isitselfeven.
Thereis a radicalincreasein expressivepower offirst-orderlanguagesas
comparedto basiclanguages.Forexample,eventhefirstpremise in theabove
argumentimplies infinitelymany basic consequencesbutit is not implied by
any numberof its basicconsequences,not even by all ofthemtogether. The
idea thata generalizationis logicallyequivalento theset of itssingular
instancesis butone ofthefallaciesthatis to beconfrontedby thoseseeking
to reducefirst-orderlogic to basic logic. Below are a few ofthesingular
instancesof thepropositionunderdiscussion.
SECOND-ORDER LOGIC
One is eitherodd or even.
Two is eitherodd or even.
Threeis eitherodd or even.
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As mentionedabove basic logic issometimes called finite logic because
each of itsconsistent(or non-contradictory)propositionsis finitelysatisfiable.
This is no longertrueof first-orderlogic. Indeed, theconjunction of the
following twopropositionsis notsatisfiablein any finiteuniverseof discourse.
Zero isnotthesuccessor of anynumber.
Every twonumberswhicharesuccessorsrespectivelyof distinctnum-
bers arethemselvesdistinct.
It is known, however,thateveryfirst-orderpropositionwhich isconsistent
is satisfiablein a countableuniverse of discourse. In fact, everyconsistent
first-orderpropositionthatis notsatisfiablein a finiteuniverseof discourse
is, like the aboveconjunction,satisfiablein theuniverseof naturalnumbers.
For thisreason,first-orderlogic can be calledcountable logic.
Justas every validbasic argumentis deducibleusing a small set of ax-
ioms and rules of inference, thesame is trueof validfirst-orderarguments.
This means thatas faras knowledge ofvalidityof first-orderargumentsis
concerned,humanknowing faculties are equal tothetask.Theso-called prin-
ciple of sufficiency ofreason,viz. thateverytruepropositioncan be known to
be true,can be shown to be false.Humanfaculties of knowingtruthare not
equal tothetaskof knowingtruth-truthoutrunsknowledge. Withvalidity
of first -order aryuments, reasonis sufficient--everyvalidfirst-orderargument
can be known to be valid.Whetherevery validargument(whatevertheor-
der) can be known to be valid is aquestionof considerablecomplexityand
well beyondthescope of thiselementaryexposition.
Thereis anothermuch lessimportantfactaboutfirst-orderand basic logic
thatis worthmentioning. Forthiswe have to divide the logicalconceptsinto
positive and negative . Withoutgoing into thedetails, let me saythatthere
are nosurpriseshere. "Every", "Some" , "Is", "And", "Or", "If ' , etc. are
positive. "Not", "No", "Distinct","Nor", etc. are negative. The resultis
thateverycontradictoryfirst-orderpropositioninvolves atleastone negative
logicalconcept.
Justas we motivatedthetransitionfrombasic logic tofirst-orderlogic by
reflecting onthefactthatthe reasoningused toestablisha basic tautology
seems strongerthanneeded forthatpurpose and indeed is sufficient (or
virtuallyso) to establishallgeneralizationsof thebasic tautology,we use
the same sortof insightto transcendfirst-orderlogic.Considerthe following
first-orderpropositions.
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No numberdivides exactlythenumbersthatdo not dividethemselves.
No numberprecedesexactlythenumbersthatdo notprecedethem-
selves.
No numberexceedsexactlythenumbersthatdo not exceedthemselves.
No numberperfectsexactlythenumbersthatdo notperfect hemselves.
The relationof perfectingarises inconnectionwith theso-calledperfect
numbers. Everynumberhavingproperdivisors isperfectedonly bythesuc-
cessor of the sum of itsproperdivisors. The othernumbers,viz. zero, one
andthe primenumbers,are notperfectedby anynumbersat all.Thus four
is perfectedby threesince two istheonlyproperdivisor of four.Butsix is
perfectedby itself. In fact, as you may have seen already, everyp rfectnum-
ber perfectsitselfand, conversely, everynumberperfectingitselfis perfect.
Now, thereason forintroducingtheperfectingrelationis to give anexample
of atautologyin thesame form asthefirstthreeof the above setbutnot as
mathematicallytrivial.Thefirst of the abovepropositionsis mathematically
trivialbecause zero, which istheonlynumberthatdoes not divide itself, is
divided by everyothernumber. The second istrivialbecauseeverynumber
precedesothernumbersbutnotitself.The thirdis trivialforsimilarreasons.
Now, as you know, each of the above can be deduced fromtheirown
respectivenegationsby familiar(but intricate)reasoning.The fact isthat
thefollowingpremise-conclusionargumentis valid.
Some numberperfectsexactlythenumbersthatdo notperfectthem-
selves.
? No numberperfectsexactlythe numbersthatdo notperfectthem-
selves.
A deductionof thisargument,i.e., a deductionof itsconclusionfrom its
premise, can easily betransformedinto anindirectproof of its conclusion.
The reasonthata deductionof a conclusionfrom thenull-premiseset is a
proof (i.e., a deductionwhose premisesareknown to betrue)is becauseuni-
versalpropositionswith null"subjects"are vacuouslytrue. Everymember
of thenull set of premises is known to betrue. . . therebeing nocounterex-
amples.
Once one ofthesetautologieshas been proved to betrueby a deduction
from thenull set ofpremises theothersare alsovirtuallyproved to betrue
also. The reason for this is theprincipleof form fordeductions:every ar-
gumentationin the same form as adeductionis againa deduction. Thus a
proofof, say,thefourthcan beobtainedfrom a proofof, say, the first by
substitutingin thelatterthe concept "perfects" for theconcept"divides". So
it is clearthathereasoningestablishingone ofthefourvirtually establishes
much more.
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Now we move tothe second-ordergeneralizationf theabove. Actually,
thefollowingsecond-orderpropositionis atonce ageneralizationf each of
theabove four firstordertautologiesand, in a certainreasonablesense, the
onlygeneralization.
No matterwhichnumericalrelationyou consider, no numberbearsit
to exactlythenumbersthatdo notbearit tothemselves.
Once you have seenthatthisis trueyou will feelthatit is theground of
thetruthofthepreviousfourpropositions,e.g., thatthetruthof thefourth
of themdependson nopeculiarityof theperfectingrelation.
My main pointin this essay isthatthereasoningin a given logic achieves
more thancan beexpressedin thatlogicandthat hetranscendingof a given
logic by going to ahigherorderis one way ofreapingthefullfruitof one's
reasoningin a given logic. This vagueprincipleappliesnotjustto first-order
in relationto basic logicand to second-orderlogic inrelation to first-order
butin generalto any logic inrelationto thenext lowerorder.
In basic sentences,thereareno common nouns. In first-ordersentences,
thereare common nouns,butno "second-ordernouns" such as'property',
'relation','function' , etc.The presenceofnounsinevitablyandautomatically
entailsthepresenceof quantifiersbecausenounsrequire articlesandarticles
expressquantifiers. For example, thefollowingsentencesexpressthesame
proposition.
Every falsepropositionimplies a trueproposition.
Everypropositionwhich is false implies somepropositionwhich istrue.
For everypropositionwhich is falsethereexistsa propositionwhich is
trueand which isimplied by thefalseproposition.
The same phenomenoncan be exemplified intheuniverseof natural
numbers(beginningwithzero).
Every oddnumberexceeds an even umber.
Everynumberwhich isodd exceeds somenumberwhich is even.
For everynumberwhich isodd thereexistsa numberwhich is evenand
which is exceeded bytheodd number.
Whenwe move tosecond-orderby addingsecond-ordernounswe alsoadd
second-orderadjectiveswhose rangesof significance are thesecond-orderob-
jectsdenotedby thesecond-ordernouns.Examplesofsecond-orderadjectives
are thefamiliartermsindicatingpropertiesof relations:reflexive,symmet-
rical,transitive,dense, etc. The following aretypicalsecond-ordersentences
involving suchexpressions.
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Everyreflexiverelationrelateseveryobjectto itself.
Everyrelationthatrelateseveryobjectto itselfis reflexive.
Everysymmetricrelationrelatesto eachotherevery two bjectsone of
which itrelatesto theother.
Everyrelationthatrelatesto eachotherevery two bjectsone of which
it relatesto theotheris symmetric.
Orthogonalityis a second-orderelationbetweenproperties.In orderfor
one propertyto beorthogonalto anotherit is necessaryandsufficientthat
therebe fourobjects,one havingbothproperties,one havingthefirstbut
lackingthesecond, onelackingthe firstbut havingthe second, and one
lackingboth.Theseexamplesshowthatmuch ofthisessay has beenwritten
using asecond-orderlanguage.
Since basic logic is finiteand since first-orderlogic iscountable,neither
is adequatetoaxiomatizetheorieswhose universes ofdiscourseareuncount-
able. The most familiarexamplesof suchtheoriesarecalculusandgeometry.
Nowjustas first-orderlogic is not finite,second-orderlogic is notcountable.
Thereare consistentsecond-orderpropositionswhich are notsatisfiablein
any countableuniverse. One example is from Hilbert'saxiom set forthe
theoryof realnumbers(which isfoundationalforcalculus).Anotheris from
Veblen's axiom set forEuclideangeometry.Naturally,second-orderlogic can
be calleduncountable logic.
First-orderlogic isnoteven adequateto axiomatizetheorieswhose uni-
verses ofdiscoursearecountablyinfinite. The paradigmcase ofsucha theory
is numbertheory, orthearithmeticof naturalnumbers, which requiresthe
principle of mathematical induction (PM!) .
Everypropertybelongingto zeroandtothesuccessorof everynumber
to which it belongs also belongs to everynumberwithoutexception.
In orderfor apropertyto belong to everynumberit is sufficient for
thatpropertyto belong tothesuccessorof everynumberhavingit and
alsothatzero have it.
Mathematicalinductionis thesecond-ordergeneralizationf each ofthe
followingpropositionswhich areamong its first-orderinstances.
If zero is evenand thesuccessorof every evennumberis even, then
everynumberis even.
If zero isperfectandthesuccessorof everyperfectnumberis perfect,
then everynumberis perfect.
In first-orderaxiomatizationsofarithmeticPMI, induction,is replacedby
theinfinite set of itsfirst-orderinstances,a set which is insufficient to imply
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mathematicalinduction.In fact, nosetoftruefirst-orderpropositionsis suf-
ficient to implyPMI andthereforenofirst-orderaxiomatizationofarithmetic
adequatelycodifiesourknowledge ofarithmetic. Moreover,thegroundof our
knowledge oftheinstancesis ourknowledge ofPMI itself.Thus infinitely
manyof the so-calledaxioms offirst-orderarithmeticarenotaxiomaticin the
traditionalsense. Nevertheless,thereare able logiciansand mathematicians
who reject thetraditionalsecond-orderaxiomatizationsdue toDedekindand
Peanoin favor ofirst-orderaxiomatizationswhichdatefrom the1930's.
Justas second-orderlogic isnecessaryto fullyexploitfirst-ordereasoning
as well as tounderstandthegroundoffirst-ordertautologies,likewise second-
orderlogic isnecessaryto fullyexploitfirst-orderknowledge inarithmeticas
well as tounderstandthegroundof acceptanceof first-orderaxiomatiza-
tionsof arithmetic. Even logicianswho rejectsecond-orderaxiomatizations
of arithmeticadmit theirhistoricimportanceand make heuristicand ped-
agogical use of suchaxiomatizations.By theway, thesame thingmay be
said ofaxiomatizationsofsettheory,butthetechnicaldetailsinvolved in set
theoryrequiredistinctionsandprincipleswhich gobeyondthescope ofthis
essay.
In thecase of basic logic, as well asthatof first-orderlogic, a small set
of simple rules ofinferencesuffices toenableevery validargumentto be
deduced. This is no longerthecase withsecond-orderlogic. In fact, it is a
corollarytothefamous G6delIncompletenessTheoremthatno simple set of
rules is sufficient forthispurpose. This means that heprincipleof sufficiency
ofreasonwhenappliedtosecond-ordervalidityis false. To beexplicit, there
are finite validargumentsin second-orderlogic whoseconclusionscan not be
deduced(in a finitenumberofsteps using simple rules) fromtheirpremise-
sets. This resultis known astheincompleteness of second-order logic.
Thereare logicians who feelthathumanreasoningmust be equalto the
taskof determiningthevalidityof validarguments.In most cases such lo-
gicians areempiricisticallyorientedand are fully willing toacceptthefact
thattherearetruepropositionsaboutthematerialuniversethatcannotbe
known to betrue. But theyfeelthatvalidityis intrinsicallyamenableto
analytica priori methodsand, in particular,thatevery validargumentmust
be deducible. One wayoutof thisquandaryis to denythatsecond-order
logic is really logic.
Incidentally,second-orderaxiomatizationsdo not evadetheincompletabil-
ity ofarithmetic. First-orderaxiomatizationsare deficientbecausefirst-order
languagesare too weak toexpressourknowledge ofarithmeticeven though
first-ordereasoningis adequateto first-ordervalidity. Withinsecond-order
thesituationis reversed.Second-orderaxiomatizationsare deficientbecause
second-orderreasoningis too weak to deduce all ofthe consequencesof
second-orderaxioms even thoughsecond-orderlanguageis strongenough
toexpressourknowledge ofarithmetic. In fact,oursecond-orderarithmetic
knowledge impliesabsolutelyeverytruesecond-orderarithmeticproposition
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even thosethatwe are powerless todeduce(using any givensimple set of
rules fixed inadvance).
Anotherphenomenonthatgives some logiciansdoubtsaboutsecond-order
logic isexistenceofcontradictorypropositionsdevoid ofnegativelogical con-
cepts. Recallthatin first-orderlogic everycontradictorypropositioninvolves
at least onenegativelogicalconcept. Below are twosecond-orderproposi-
tionsthefirst of which istautologicalndthesecond of which iscontradictory,
neitherof which involvenegativelogicalconcepts.
Everyobjecthas atleastone property.
Everypropertybelongsto atleastone object.
The reasonthatthesecondpropositionis self-contradictoryis thatit con-
tradictsthefollowingtautology.
No objecthas thepropertyof beingdistinctfrom itself.
We have seenthatsecond-orderlogic differsradicallyfrom first-order.
First-orderis a logic ofcountability;second-orderis a logic ofuncountabil-
ity. First-orderis deductivelycomplete; second-orderis deductivelyincom-
plete. Infirst-ordereverycontradictionis negative;in second-orderthereare
self-contradictorypropositionswhich are exclusivelypositive. The above-
mentionedhistoricexamplesofaxiomatizedsciencesremind us thathigher-
orderreasoningis not arecentinnovationbut rathera featureof human
thoughthavinga longhistory. Moreover, it isnotthecase thatlogicians
startedoutstudyingbasic logicand thenmoved on tofirst-orderand then
tosecond-order,etc. Inthefirst place,Aristotle'slogic is afragmentof first-
orderand fundamentalaspectsof basic logic were not to bediscoveredfor
some centurieslater.In thesecond place, inmoderntimes higher-orderlogics
werestudiedbefore first-orderlogic wasisolatedas a systemworthyofstudy
in its ownright.
AfterAristotle's logic had been assimilatedby laterthinkers,people
emergedwho couldnot accepttheidea thatAristotle'slogic was not com-
prehensive. These conservativelogiciansattemptedto "reduce"all logically
cogentreasoningto Aristotle'syllogisticlogic. Likewise, afterfirst-order
logic had beenisolatedand had beenassimilatedby thelogiccommunity,
people emergedwho couldnotaccepttheidea thatfirst-orderlogic was not
comprehensive.Theselogicians can be viewed not asconservativeswho want
to reinstatean outmodedtraditionbutratheras radicalswho wantto over-
throwan establishedtradition. It remainsto be seenwhetherhigher-order
logic will ever regainthedegree ofacceptancethatit enjoyedbetween1910
and 1930. Buttherehas never been aseriousdoubtconcerningits heuristic
andhistoricimportance. In fact, people who do not knowsecond-orderlogic
can notunderstandthemoderndebateover itslegitimacyandtheyarecut-
off fromtheheuristicadvantagesof second-orderlogic. And, whatmay be
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worse,theyare cut-off from anunderstandingofthehistoryof logicandthe
historyof mathematics, andthusareconstrainedto havedistortedviews of
thenatureofthetwosubjects.As Aristotlefirst said, we do notunderstand
a disciplineuntilwe have seen itsdevelopment. It is atruismthata person's
conceptions ofwhata discipline is and ofwhatit can become arepredicated
on aconceptionofwhatit has been.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This essayis based on atutorialthatI led at the OhioUniversityInference
Conference,October9-11,1986. I am indebtedtoProfessorRichardButrick
not only fororganizingtheconferencebutalso fororganizingme. In the
yearpriorto theconference hesuppliedme, by phone andin writing,with
dozens ofquestions,hypotheses,suggestionsandrequestsfrom whichtheba-
sic contentandgoals of mytutorialemerged. James Gasser, Woosuk Park
and Ronald Rudnicki helped withtheeditingand proof-reading. I am also
indebtedto thestudentsand colleagueswithwhom I studiedsecond-order
logic over the years, especially George Weaver,StewartShapiro, Michael
Scanlanand EdwardKeenan. Verylittlein this essay is original. Most of
whatis here isalreadyin thewritingsof Alfred Tarski, Leon Henkin, Alonzo
Church, Georg Kreisel and George Boolos. Almost everyhumanisticallyori-
ented essay onmodernlogic isindebtedto Tarski,Church,andQuine. Their
technicalcompetence,theirobjectivity,theircreativityand, above all,their
constantattentionto thehumanimportanceof logic are largelyresponsible
forpreserving,transformingand revitalizinga richtraditionthat racesback
toAristotle. One sign ofthevitalityofthetraditionis thefactthatnot one
of theabove-mentionedlogicians agrees witheverythingwrittenin this essay,
even when theheuristicover-simplificationsare emended.
